In Hoffman v. Lindgren, No. 22-35471 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2023), the Ninth Circuit resolves an intracircuit split and holds that no leniency is due to pro se litigants who are also licensed, practicing attorneys.
“Huffman, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon in Columbia County Circuit Court. Huffman contends that, via an oral motion, he disqualified Judge Lindgren from hearing his client’s case; he alleges that she ignored this disqualification, held him in contempt, and imprisoned him for six hours.”
In his complaint, Huffman alleged that the imprisonment in county jail for six hours “was a violation of [his] state a [sic] federal constitutional rights” and the judge’s acts against him were “violation[s] of the plaintiffs [sic] right to due process and equal protection.”
The defendants removed the complaint to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal-question jurisdiction. Huffman moved to remand.” Huffman urges that the complaint was just poorly drafted; he never meant to include federal [constitutional] claims, so he asked for leave to amend so he can seek remand to state court.” Leave to amend was denied, the district court dismissed the federal claims, and substantially remanded the state claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirms. The first and principal issue is whether the panel has removal jurisdiction. “Huffman argues that he never intended to include a federal claim. Despite Huffman’s second thoughts about his own allegations, the complaint is unambiguous” in stating federal constitutional claims. Because he “facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
“Huffman’s argument that his complaint was poorly written is creative but unavailing. Huffman neither moved to amend in the district court nor voluntarily dismissed the case, and his attempt at backtracking now seems aimed at robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. A sophisticated attorney like Huffman should not be allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation.”
“We next address the proper pleading standard for a pro se litigant who is also a licensed attorney, a question that has split several district courts in this circuit.” While some districts “liberally construe the filings of attorneys who appear pro se,” others decline to apply liberal construction to lawyer-drafted pleadings. “The circuits that have reached the issue speak with one voice: they have uniformly declined to extend the liberal pleading standard to pro se attorneys.”
“We join this chorus. There is a good reason that we afford leeway to pro se parties, who appear without counsel and without the benefit of sophisticated representation: ‘Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel.’ Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). That logic does not apply to practicing attorneys, nor should the grace extend to them.”
The panel then briefly reviews and affirms the merits.
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