In Chisolm v. State of Louisiana, No. 22-30320 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2023), a split panel affirms denial of a motion to dissolve a voting-rights consent decree under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). That rule provides that a party may move for relief from a judgment if it “has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.” This case concerns the first and third clauses of the rule.
In 1992, the state entered into a consent decree to settle a lawsuit about whether the apportionment of districts for seats on the state supreme court violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The decree provided for reapportionment, to include at least one majority Black district, and other relief.
“On December 2, 2021, the State filed a motion to dissolve the Consent Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), asserting that the Consent Judgment had been satisfied, released, or discharged and that applying the Consent Judgment prospectively was no longer equitable.” In addition to contending that it had met all the conditions of the consent decree, the “State also asserted that the Consent Judgment had increased malapportionment in the seven supreme court districts and had stymied the Louisiana Legislature’s efforts to remedy that issue.”
The district court denied the relief. It held (under the first clause) that the state failed to meet its burden under Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (the Dowell standard) to prove that “the [State] had complied in good faith with the . . . decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.” It also held (under the third clause) that the state did meet the standards of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), because the alleged changed circumstances – the “severe malapportionment” of Louisiana’s supreme court districts – was not a new problem and in fact had declined in importance over the past decade.
The Fifth Circuit affirms. The panel majority reviews the lower-court’s decision under first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) and holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the state failed to meet the burden for relief under either clause.
Under the first clause, the judgment being “satisfied, released, or discharged,” the panel majority holds under the Dowell standard that final remedy of the consent decree had not been accomplished. “The district court correctly determined that the Consent Judgment’s final remedy is the State’s prospective compliance with Section 2 of the VRA . . . . When a consent decree contemplates future compliance, ‘the prospective provisions of the consent decree operate as an injunction.’ As noted above, however, the Consent Judgment repeatedly states that its goal is to ‘ensure’ that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s election methods comply with the VRA.”
The state disputed the application of Dowell standard, holding that a more lenient “substantial compliance” standard ought to apply. The panel majority holds – noting this as a matter of first impression for the circuit – that Dowell provides the correct analysis because the decree is properly classified as an “institutional reform decree.” The “Consent Judgment . . . aims to ensure prospective compliance with the VRA and the U.S. Constitution. This classification matters. The Supreme Court has held that institutional reform decrees are treated differently than ordinary consent decrees ‘because such decrees ‘reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public’s right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions.’’ As a result, ‘[d]istrict courts must take a flexible approach to . . . institutional reform decrees” because ‘[f]lexibility is ‘often essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.’” The panel majority notes support for applying Dowell to institutional reform decrees from the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.
“Here, the State provided no evidence, plans, or assurances of compliance with Section 2 of the VRA in the event that the Consent Judgment is terminated. The State’s evidence focuses only on past compliance with the Consent Judgment . . . . The State has refused to provide evidence, plans, or assurances of future compliance, instead maintaining that Dowell is inapplicable.” The panel majority also holds that there was no record that “the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable,” even though several Black justices had been elected since the decree was entered.
Under the third clause, “the State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong, which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that warrant reexamination of a consent decree. The State only makes very general claims about malapportionment and asserts that ‘new policy concerns’ have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no evidentiary support for this argument.” Indeed, “[t]he Consent Judgment itself allows the State to reapportion the election districts as long it complies with the Consent Judgment,” which “significantly weaken[s] the State’s assertion that the Louisiana Legislature is hamstrung by the Consent Judgment in redistricting matters.”
In dissent, Judge Engelhardt would hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the state relief. The dissent argues that (1) heightened deference to the district court order is inconsistent with Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009); (2) the state had substantially and in good faith complied with the decree by enacting all of the remedies articulated therein; (3) further demanding “the State’s prospective compliance with Section 2 of the VRA” was circular; (4) “the State has also articulated specific concerns about malapportionment and the obstacles that the Consent Judgment imposes to solving that problem”; and (5) “perpetuat[ing] this Consent Judgment prospectively, void of any demonstrable VRA violation, is an unwarranted affront to self-governance” and federalism.
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