In Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., No. 23-6359 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2023), the Fourth Circuit holds that a judge’s denial of a preliminary injunction that merely cites the “reasons stated” during a telephonic hearing does not meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2), which requires a statement “of the findings and conclusions that support its action.”
“Plaintiffs-Appellants, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County, Maryland, appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release program violates the Due Process Clause.”
The detainees alleged that – contrary to state law – courts sometimes conferred power on another arm of the correctional system, Pretrial Services, to set further conditions on their release. “To make this determination, Pretrial Services uses a non-exhaustive set of considerations, which primarily relate to the detainee’s dangerousness and flight risk. Pretrial Services makes this decision without a county judge’s involvement. And the process can take months, during which the detainee may not be provided status updates. In the end, a detainee may never hear anything at all from Pretrial Services.”
“After an eight-month delay, the district court took up the preliminary-injunction motion in a telephonic hearing. It explained that the delay was due to the lack of a factual record. And it maintained that there still wasn’t enough of a record for it to rule on the motion.” Weeks later, the judge denied the motion in a written order “for the reasons stated on the record during the [] telephone conference.” The detainees appealed.
The Fourth Circuit vacates and remands. Without reaching the merits of the case, the panel holds that the order fell short of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). Under that rule, a district court “must explain its decision.” The rule “ensures that parties are informed of the district court’s reasoning, and . . . allows for meaningful appellate review . . . . Without findings and conclusions, neither the parties nor this Court know why the district court denied the injunction. So challenging that decision and reviewing it are made tougher. Indeed, it becomes somewhat of a guessing game: Did the district court abuse its discretion in balancing the equities, evaluating irreparable harm, or considering the public interest? Or was the denial based on a factual finding or legal conclusion that rendered success on the merits unlikely?”
The panel observes that “[i]n most contexts,” such as admission of evidence and jury instructions, “a district court’s lack of explanation doesn’t amount to error” by itself. Yet in the case of preliminary injunctions, the express language of Rule 52(a)(2) controls. And “while Rule 52(a)(2)’s burden is not Herculean” and “does not require a tome that memorializes all factual minutiae or responds to every legal assertion,” it does require something. “[T]he findings and conclusions required are those that are necessary, in context, to the action taken” and the more factual uncertainties and complex legal issues, the more explanation the district court must give.”
Though it would be possible consistent with Rule 52(a)(2) to state reasons verbally on the record and then adopt them by reference, here “[a]ll the court noted was that it did not know enough facts to decide the merits of the issue either way . . . . the district court did not make any findings that the plaintiff failed to establish material facts crucial to success on the merits. Instead, it spoke in broad strokes without identifying material facts that were unclear or ambiguous. Conclusory statements about the lack of a record and the existence of factual uncertainty cannot suffice under Rule 52(a)(2).”
The panel also entertains but rejects the detainees’ argument that, notwithstanding the error, the court had jurisdiction to review the current record and grant interlocutory relief. “To determine whether the detainees’ requested preliminary injunction should issue, we would have to decide whether they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the pretrial-release program violates their due-process rights. Among other things, that requires us to know how the program operates. But we are hesitant to make such a finding on appeal.”
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