In Rosa v. Doe, No. 21-2628 (2d Cir. Nov. 20. 2023), the Second Circuit holds that the district court abused its discretion in denying a prisoner in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 on the ground that his “necessities of life” were furnished by the prison.
“On April 5, 2021, Rosa filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint charged that Rosa received insufficient medical care in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), a complaint is not filed until a civil filing and administrative fee totaling $402 is paid. Lacking the funds to cover this fee, “Rosa submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis along with his complaint, requesting that the court allow him to proceed without prepayment of the $402 filing fee.” (Under the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act (‘PLRA’), prisoners filing in federal court are eligible only for a payment plan for court costs, not a full waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).)
The district court denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The judge acknowledged the generous standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, per Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948), that a plaintiff need not be “absolutely destitute” to qualify and need only demonstrate that they “cannot because of [their] poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide [themselves] and dependents with the necessities of life.” The district court nevertheless found that (1) that “[a]s a prisoner, Rosa does not pay for room or board” and thus the prison provides Rosa’s “necessities of life”; and (2) that Rosa elected to send funds home to his mother and son, and that “[w]hile the desire to help his family is admirable, plaintiff still made a choice to do so rather than paying the filing fee.”
The Second Circuit reverses and remands. Following a scholarly discussion of the ancient common law roots of in forma pauperis, the panel observes that the “law is not meant to be a series of traps and travails for pro se litigants, nor does it aim to dismiss potentially meritorious arguments because of the particularities of federal practice.” So the fact that plaintiff’s § 1915 petition may not have explicated fully his argument (about supporting his family) is not occasion for forfeiture, as the state argued, where there was enough evidence in support of his position attached as exhibits.
The panel drops a footnote about the deficiencies of the court’s in forma pauperis form. “We are especially loathe to construe strictly procedural rules against a pro se litigant where the motion in question was submitted according to a form provided by the court. If, as here, the form fails to ask for potentially relevant information, it would be perverse to hold that failure against the litigant. As the author of the form, the court can easily add additional instructions or questions ensuring that necessary information is submitted. A litigant who earnestly responds to the questions that the court asks should not be penalized by the court’s failure to ask for basic information the court in fact requires.”
The panel further notes that a parent may be a dependent for purposes of Adkins. “Connecticut . . . notes that no prior court has addressed whether a movant’s parents may qualify as Adkins dependents . . . . It is unnecessary for us to determine the outer bounds of who may be considered a dependent to resolve this case. Because of the unrestricted usage of the word ‘dependent’ in Adkins and Congress’s broad intent to enable poor litigants to access the courts in enacting this statute, at a minimum, immediate family members such as parents must be understood to qualify. Moreover, any reasonable definition of dependent includes the potential for dependent parents.”
The panel also concludes that prisons do not necessarily provide inmates with the “necessities of life.” “Despite their incarceration, prisoners maintain their own, often complex, economic lives . . . . [P]risoners may well have financial obligations that warrant consideration in a Section 1915(a) evaluation: medical debts, court fines, student loans, support orders, among other examples. Moreover, prisons all too frequently fail to provide necessary hygiene essentials and often charge substantial rates for postage and phone calls that prisoners need to maintain relationships with family and friends.” Thus, “an inquiry into whether a movant meets Section 1915(a)’s standard may not simply presume that, because incarceration provides food and lodging, the movant does not need any financial resources to secure necessities.”
“Accordingly, we reverse the district court and direct the court to consider whether Rosa, having met the standard of Section 1915(a), meets Section 1915’s other requirements and is thus deserving of in forma pauperis status.”
Paul Mollica's Federal Courts Blog 