In Folse v. Hoffman, No. 23-1709 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2024), the Fourth Circuit finds no error in the district court striking a complaint and dismissing an action, where the pro se plaintiff attempted to file the action “electronically,” by way of a fax machine.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(3)(B)(i) says pro se litigants may ‘file electronically only if allowed by court order or by local rule.’ The current rules do not define ‘file electronically.’ But a previous version of Rule 5 referenced ‘fil[ing] by facsimile or other electronic means.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(e) (1994) (repealed 1996) (emphasis added). And when that language was removed, the Advisory Committee notes stated that ‘[f]acsimile transmission continues to be included as an electronic means.’ Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1996 Amendment. That conclusion—that filing by fax is a form of electronic filing—squares nicely with the plain meaning of ‘electronically,’ and [plaintiff] does not challenge it.”
The plaintiff filed his complaint via fax. “[Plaintiff] Folse tried to start a lawsuit by faxing a complaint to a federal district court. The clerk stamped the complaint ‘filed,’ created an electronic docket for the case, and added the complaint to the docket. Two weeks later, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, determining its local rules did not permit filing complaints by fax and declining Folse’s request for permission to do so.”
The Fourth Circuit affirms, finding no order or local rule that authorized a pro se litigant to file electronically. The plaintiff relied on N.D. W. Va. Local Rule Gen. P. 5.05(a), which he argued authorized the fax filing by inference, i.e., that only represented parties were barred from filing a complaint by fax.
“The question is not, as Folse asserts, whether Local Rule 5.05(a) prohibits only represented litigants from filing complaints by fax. As just explained, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already bar pro se litigants from fax filing any document unless ‘allowed’ to do so by local rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(3)(B)(i). For that reason, it would not be enough for Folse to show that Local Rule 5.05(a) does not forbid him from filing his complaint by fax. Rather, Folse needs to identify a local rule that affirmatively authorized him to do so.”
Nor did the district court’s action deprive the plaintiff of any rights under Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2), which states that “[a] local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.”
The panel notes that “[t]he district court clerk did not refuse to accept Folse’s document for filing . . . . Instead, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, which left the door open for refiling . . . .True, the statute of limitations would normally have run by the time the district court dismissed Folse’s complaint because he submitted it on the last day of the relevant limitations period. But the timely delivery of Folse’s complaint stopped the statute of limitations from running . . . and it appears Folse had another year to refile this action after the district court dismissed the complaint based on Folse’s failure to file it in a proper manner.”
Of course, the district court was not obliged to strike the complaint. “Rather than dismissing the complaint outright, the district court could have permitted Folse to file his complaint by fax or issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the paper-document requirement . . . . But no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or local rule gave Folse the right to do what he did here, and he has not shown that the district court committed legal error or abused its discretion in declining to bend the normal rules for him.”
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