In R.A. v. McClenahan, No. 24-1008 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), the Fourth Circuit reverses a district court’s action granting leave to the plaintiff to amend their complaint after remand from the first appeal, despite that a panelist on the first appeal (who has since taken senior status) expressly suggested that course in a separate opinion.
The lawsuit alleged under federal and North Carolina state law that a teacher “repeatedly subjected [minor child] G.A. to physical and emotional abuse and that the school officials knew of the abuse but negligently failed to intervene. The school officials moved to dismiss the negligence counts against them, claiming that they were ‘barred by public official immunity and should be dismissed with prejudice’ . . . . The district court denied the motion and the school officials filed a timely interlocutory appeal.”
On the first appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim that could pierce public official immunity, that the “state law claims against appellants must thus be dismissed, and [that] the district court’s decision to the contrary is reversed.” R.A. v. Johnson, 36 F.4th 537, 540 (4th Cir. 2022). Yet a concurring opinion suggested that “on remand the district court should consider rendering the dismissal of these negligence claims as without prejudice to allow R.A. a chance to amend her complaint.” Id. at 547 n.1 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment).
On remand, the district court – citing the concurrence – gave the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, then (for the second time) denied a motion to dismiss.
The Fourth Circuit holds that the district court thereby violated the mandate rule, and again orders dismissal of the case.
Under the mandate rule, with rare exceptions, district courts must carry out the directives of the court of appeals. “In our hierarchical judicial system, it is ‘axiomatic’ that our decisions ‘bind the district courts just as decisions of the Supreme Court bind’ us . . . . Hierarchical systems, with their respect for entry-level resolution succeeded by review, exist to deflect the perception that justice is definitively dispensed by a single hand.”
Despite that the first panel directed dismissal of the action, “the district court took the view that our mandate left it the discretion to grant a dismissal without prejudice, meaning that R.A. would have been free to refile the claims even if they had been dismissed.” Yet “[t]his reading of our mandate was at odds with basic principles of civil procedure” because the clear import of the original order was that it was a dismissal with prejudice.
The panel cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), which provides that a dismissal is “an adjudication on the merits” unless (1) it is “for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party,” or (2) the court “states otherwise.” “The phrase ‘adjudication on the merits’ in this context simply means ‘with prejudice.’” The panel holds that neither exception would apply here. The original panel decision adjudicated the state officials’ immunity defense on the merits, while nothing in the majority decision suggested that further proceedings were warranted or otherwise afforded the district court the option of reopening the case.
Regarding the suggestion in the concurring opinion that the case might be reopened on remand, the panel regards it as inoperative. “Separate opinions undoubtedly serve valuable purposes, both as a source of insight in the present and as a voice of persuasion in the future. Within the confines of the case, however, it is the majority opinion that binds the district court, and, further, applies precedentially. And as we have explained, the plain import of the majority opinion required the court to dismiss the claims with prejudice.”
Finally, the supposed discovery of additional evidence following the mandate did not rise to “extraordinary circumstances” to disregard the rule. “The mandate-rule exceptions are [not] meant . . . to provide a second bite at the apple. The ‘new evidence’ proffered here is nothing more than redundant details dressed up as a smoking gun. If the exception applied this broadly it would invite abuse by enabling parties to evade unfavorable mandates simply by tacking on incremental allegations after losing an appeal. Such a result would let the exception overrun the rule and reduce appellate mandates to empty formalities.”
“In sum, the ‘state law claims against appellants must thus be dismissed, and the district court’s decision to the contrary is reversed.’ Johnson, 36 F.4th at 546. We meant what we said the first time.”
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