In Gelin v. Baltimore Cnty., No. 23-1541 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024), the Fourth Circuit holds an appeal before it “in abeyance” until the district court decides a pending Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion. The panel has occasion to decide that Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) – which provides that certain motions in the district court reset the time for noticing an appeal – applies to an interlocutory appeal, thus splitting with the Eleventh Circuit.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) generally requires that an appeal be noticed with 30 days of entry of a judgment (60 days when a federal agency or officer is a party). A major exception occurs in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), where the timely filing of any of six specially enumerated motions in the district court suspends and resets the running of the 30- (or 60-) day clock. One of those motions, the one at issue in this case, is a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment.
“Ashleigh Gelin died by her own hand in November 2013 within days of her incarceration at Baltimore County Detention Center. Ashleigh’s parents sued on behalf of themselves and Ashleigh’s estate, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland common law against Baltimore County medical and correctional personnel (and their employers) [collectively, the County]. Years of litigation followed.”
This third interlocutory appeal concerns denial of the County’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which it sought dismissal on the grounds of qualified, public-official, and qualified immunity. Twenty-eight days after the district court denied the motion, “the County asked the district court to change its mind.” It moved erroneously under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b), though in substance (the Fourth Circuit holds) it was a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider. While “[t]he district court reaffirmed its previous findings,” it reserved the single issue of public-official immunity, ordering plaintiffs to respond to the County’s argument on that point. “But before the court could rule on the pending issue, the County noticed this appeal.”
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit holds that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider the case while the district court still had the public-official immunity issue under advisement.
“The events in the district court leading up to the filing of this appeal create a curious problem of appellate procedure. The County’s notice of appeal designated an order partly denying reconsideration, not the order being reconsidered. Applying Rules 3 and 4, we must decide whether that notice was timely and sufficient to appeal the district court’s decision denying judgment on the pleadings.”
The panel holds that the filing of the motion to reconsider, even if improperly designated as a Rule 52(b) motion, stopped and reset the appellate clock.
“Civil Rule 59(e) requires motions ‘to alter or amend a judgment’ to be filed ‘no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.’ A judgment, for these purposes, means ‘any order from which an appeal lies.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Because the district court’s Rule 12(c) decision denied the correctional officers qualified immunity at the pleading stage, it was appealable at least to that extent . . . . It was thus a ‘judgment’ under the Civil Rules. A motion asking the district court to rethink that ruling would have been proper under Civil Rule 59(e), and so it would be eligible for tolling under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).”
In so holding, the panel splits from the Eleventh Circuit. “The Eleventh Circuit has held that Rule 4(a)(4) ‘cannot apply’ in an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal, since all the motions listed there ‘are from final judgments,’ and ‘there is no final judgment’ in an interlocutory appeal. Pruett v. Choctaw County, 9 F.3d 96, 97 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Respectfully, we disagree. Neither Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) nor the Civil Rules that it cites requires a ‘final’ judgment. The word ‘judgment,’ as defined by Civil Rule 54(a), sweeps broadly enough to cover all appealable orders, even interlocutory ones . . . . We hold that Rule 4(a)(4)(A) governs interlocutory appeals.”
Because the district court had not fully addressed the Rule 59 motion, though, the appeal is premature. “When Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(i) defects show themselves early on, the proper action may be to dismiss the appeal as premature. But we think, as our sister circuits do, that when the problem doesn’t show its face ‘until significant judicial and attorney resources have been expended,’ we have the option ‘to stay the appeal until the motion is decided.’” In its discretion, therefore, the panel elects to hold onto the appeal pending a decision by the district court on the remaining public-official immunity issue.
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