In Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 24-299 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2025), the Ninth Circuit dismisses an appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court erred in taking judicial notice of the corporate defendant’s citizenship. It thus took the side of the Tenth Circuit, which holds that a court cannot judicially notice a party’s citizenship, and rejected the rulings of the Fifth Circuit and other courts to the contrary.
The plaintiffs, in a putative class action, sued Kimberly-Clark for allegedly false labeling of its Kleenex Germ Removal Wet Wipes. The district court “dismissed the non-California Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the remaining claims [on the merits] because it was not plausible that the labels would deceive a reasonable consumer.”
The Ninth Circuit dismisses the appeal and orders the case dismissed without prejudice. “The sole question we decide on appeal is whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have alleged no federal claims, and neither party contends that we could exercise jurisdiction based on any provision other than 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) [diversity jurisdiction] or § 1332(d)(2) [the Class Action Fairness Act, or CAFA].”
The panel holds that plaintiffs failed to allege the defendant’s citizenship, dooming diversity jurisdiction. The “jurisdictional section [of the complaint] alleges that each plaintiff is a citizen of California, Washington, or Wyoming. But it says nothing about Kimberly-Clark’s citizenship.”
The parties both argued, in the interest of preserving appellate jurisdiction over the case, that the district court properly took judicial notice of the corporation’s citizenship. “Our sister circuits are divided on whether a corporate defendant’s citizenship can be judicially noticed, and we have not decided the question. In the Tenth Circuit, a court cannot judicially notice a party’s citizenship . . . . In the Fifth Circuit, however, a court may do so.” (The panel opinion notes that the Second and Third Circuits, without analysis, also took notice of a corporation’s citizenship.)
Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, “we hold that plaintiffs may not avoid pleading jurisdiction by relying on judicial notice.”
“By contrast, we find the Fifth Circuit’s logic unpersuasive. It relied on Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), which allows courts to judicially notice a fact that ‘can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned’ . . . . The Fifth Circuit, however, assumed that this Rule of Evidence applies even when courts evaluate whether a party has adequately pleaded subject-matter jurisdiction.” But evidence is not considered when deciding whether a plaintiff plausibly alleges jurisdiction in a complaint.
The panel notes that a corporation is a citizen both where it is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business. Only the former may be reliably ascertained from public records, though; the latter is a fact question. “Rarely can we ‘accurately and readily determine [that information] from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).”
“Without diversity of citizenship, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction.”
(For the balance of the opinion, the panel also holds that plaintiffs inadequately plead the amount in controversy under CAFA.)
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