In Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club LLC, No. 24-1555 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026), the Fourth Circuit holds that “failing to oppose a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion is not a sufficient ground for a court’s concluding that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Plaintiffs are “professional female models” who alleged that the defendant appropriated their images for publicity without their permission. “They brought their action in nine counts, asserting two counts for violations of the Lanham Act and seven counts for violations of state law, including a claim in Count III for ‘Common Law Right of Publicity — Misappropriation of Likeness.’”
Defendant moved to dismiss and “plaintiffs failed to respond . . . within the 14-day period fixed by District of South Carolina Local Rule 7.06. The district court promptly and sua sponte issued the following order on the docket, dated April 12, 2024:”
“TEXT ORDER granting as unopposed Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, all of which Defendant has asserted fail to state a claim, are dismissed with prejudice; Count III, alleging a state law claim for misappropriation of likeness, is dismissed without prejudice as the Court, having dismissed the only federal claims, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count III. It also entered final judgment that same day.”
Although plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion claiming that local counsel failed to inform New York counsel of the pending deadline, the district court denied relief, stating that “a lawyer’s ignorance or carelessness do[es] not present [a] cognizable ground[] for relief under” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court thereafter denied subsequent motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)(6).
The Fourth Circuit vacates and remands.
“[A] ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) presents a pure question of law, which simply inquires whether the complaint alleges sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to provide a sufficient basis to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Because Rule 12(b)(6) specifies no other ground for granting a motion to dismiss, it follows that it can be granted only if the complaint on its face fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Following that analysis, Rule 12(b)(6) on its face does not support the district court’s hasty dismissal. The rule’s “failure to provide or imply that an opposing party must respond to the motion or that the failure to respond will result in the default relief of dismissal stands in stark contrast to other rules where procedural default is provided” (citing as examples Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(E), 8(b)(6), 12(h)(1), and 36(a)(3)). If a court could grant a [Rule 12(b)(6)] dismissal motion simply because it is unopposed, then ‘the case is simply not being dismissed because the complaint has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . [but] [r]ather . . . as a sanction.’ Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991).”
Here, “[n]othing in the record shows that the district court assessed the complaint and determined whether the factual matter alleged in it plausibly stated a claim for relief. Rather, the only reason appearing for granting the motion was the plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely opposition, and that reason does not address the sufficiency of the complaint, as is necessary when deciding such a motion.”
“Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment dated April 12, 2024, and remand for further proceedings. Because of this ruling, we need not address the district court’s post-judgment orders denying the plaintiffs’ motions under Rules 59(e) and 60(b).”
Paul Mollica's Federal Courts Blog 