In Rouse v. Fader, No. 25-1004 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2026), a 2-1 panel of the Fourth Circuit holds that the plaintiffs—“three married couples, each with one spouse who was an active-duty servicemember”—lacked Article III standing to enforce the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3902, because no injury was fairly traceable to the defendants: the Governor of Maryland and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland.
“Members of our military on active duty receive procedural protections in civil suits. These protections ensure that those actively defending our nation get a fair shake in civil courts, safeguarding their civil rights and pausing legal burdens so they can concentrate on their military responsibilities. 50 U.S.C. § 3902.”
The Relief Act, among other things, restricts the entry of judgments against absent servicemembers. “The Act provides that ‘before entering judgment for the plaintiff,’ the court “shall require the plaintiff to file . . . an affidavit’ stating ‘whether or not the defendant is in military service.’ § 3931(b)(1). If the defendant is in active military service, then ‘the court may not enter a judgment until after the court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant.’ § 3931(b)(2).”
Plaintiffs—servicemembers and their spouses—were subject to judgments in collection actions in Maryland during a period when they were deployed in active duty and covered by the Relief Act. They “allege that Maryland failed to comply with [the Relief Act] protections. So they sued the Governor of Maryland and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland, claiming they should have taken steps available to them in their respective positions to require compliance with the federal statute.”
Plaintiffs sought “(1) damages; (2) an injunction preventing Defendants from ‘issu[ing] or enforc[ing] any purported judgments . . . that do not comply with the basic requirements of the’ Relief Act; (3) an injunction directing Defendants to expunge all records of . . . collection proceedings involving . . . Plaintiffs; and (4) a declaratory judgment stating that the Relief Act ‘preempts Maryland law including the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act’ and that ‘any judgments obtained in violation of the [Relief Act] in the State of Maryland . . . are unenforceable.’”
The district court ruled against the plaintiffs. Against the Governor, the court dismissed (for failure to state a claim) “on the ground that domestication provided the only possible basis on which to hold him liable,” and that “domesticating a foreign judgment in Maryland failed to . . . implicate the Relief Act.” Against the state-court Justices, the court granted summary judgment on individual-capacity legislative immunity grounds.
The Fourth Circuit affirms in a 2-1 opinion. Rather than reach the merits, as the district court did, the panel majority holds that there was no injury traceable to the Justices or the Governor, and thus the action had to be dismissed for lack of Article III standing.
Plaintiff did not charge the state officials with directly violating their federal rights, but instead with failing to adopt state-court procedures to protect them from judgments by third parties, allegedly obtained in violation of the Relief Act.
“[W]hen a plaintiff’s injury results from third-party conduct, the plaintiff can satisfy traceability through either of two showings: (i) the defendant’s action had a determinative or coercive effect on the third-party’s conduct; or (ii) the third party’s conduct was the predictable effect of the defendant’s action. A claimed failure to remind officials to follow federal law doesn’t satisfy either one.”
With respect to the Justices, “[t]he relevant third-party conduct is the state-court clerks’ issuance of writs of garnishment, which Plaintiffs argue violated the Relief Act.” Yet “a clerk’s duty to follow § 3931’s procedures exists independent of anything that the Justices did or did not do. Indeed, the clerks did not need a Maryland rule of civil procedure to understand and comply with their federal obligations—they were already legally obligated to do so. They simply needed to read the Relief Act. Thus, a Maryland rule [promulgated by the state supreme court that] incorporate[ed] § 3931 would have been nothing more than a reminder to comply with pre-existing obligations.”
As far as the Governor, he could not be liable simply based on his “general executive authority” to enforce federal law. “Plaintiffs have not explained—and cannot explain—how anything the Governor did or did not do relates to the clerks’ allegedly unlawful conduct.”
“Plaintiffs’ rights under the Relief Act may have been violated. But even a statutory violation does not permit them to conjure the power of the federal courts to sue whomever they please. Because their injuries are not fairly traceable to any act or omission by these Defendants, Plaintiffs have failed to sue proper parties. The district court’s judgment is vacated and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Judge Gregory dissents and would hold that the claims against the Justices should proceed, because their failure to adopt state-court procedures to guide the clerks proximately caused the plaintiffs’ losses.
“Maryland’s judges and clerks know they are bound by Maryland’s rules, and they (presumably) endeavor to comply with those rules. If the Justices clarified the responsibilities imposed on them, it is fair to assume the judges and clerks would comply, exempting the occasional rogue actor. After all, that is the Justices’ responsibility: they dictate how Maryland’s courts operate, rendering any systemic failure traceable to them. And from what we know, this was a systemic failure—at least three separate Maryland court employees harmed Plaintiffs in an identical way, contrary to the Relief Act’s protections.”
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“Here, Maryland’s Constitution, statutes, and court rules make clear that the Justices govern Maryland’s courts, and that Maryland’s administrative judges and clerks must comply with the rules the Justices adopt. To find traceability here, we need only recognize that individuals are impacted by the rules controlling their behavior. I find that requirement easily satisfied in this case.”
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