Seventh Circuit Holds That Lawyer Has No Article III Standing to Appeal Court Order Revoking His Pro Hac Vice Admission Where Case Below Is Settled and Dismissed with Prejudice

In Bailey v. Worthington Cylinder Corp., No. 22-2111 (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024), the Seventh Circuit dismisses an out-of-state lawyer’s appeal of a lower order revoking his pro hac vice admission, holding that his reputational interest alone does not present a redressable interest to support Article III standing.

Appellant counsel “is an attorney licensed to practice in California. In 2016, he was admitted pro hac vice to appear for the plaintiff before the Northern District of Illinois in this products-liability lawsuit. The defendants later moved to revoke [counsel]’s pro hac vice admission,” asserting that counsel had “filed frivolous motions, disregarded court rulings, and, when he filed his pro hac vice application, failed to disclose prior disciplinary actions by two other courts.”

While the magistrate judge initially denied defendants’ motion, the district court granted it (in a 48-page opinion), on grounds that counsel had impugned the integrity of the magistrate, “made more false statements, lied about facts to the court, and misstated the court’s orders.” Counsel first sought to take an interlocutory appeal of the revocation under the collateral order doctrine, but the Seventh Circuit dismissed it. “After the suit underlying the current appeal was dismissed with prejudice in June 2022 pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, [counsel] filed this appeal.”

The Seventh Circuit once again dismisses the appeal, this time on standing grounds. Without a case below to return to, reasons the panel, counsel lacks effective relief.

“Even if we assume that [counsel] suffered a concrete injury caused by the defendants (thus satisfying the first two criteria [of Article III standing]), the defendants argue that his alleged injury cannot be redressed by judicial action.” The panel agrees. “If we were to examine the merits of the appeal and rule that the district judge abused his discretion by revoking [counsel]’s pro hac vice admission, we could not fashion any effective relief. The case was dismissed with prejudice after the parties settled. [Counsel] has no case to return to and no client to represent.”

The panel distinguishes this case from one where a district court imposes a formal sanctions order of reprimand or disbarment, which courts hold does present a redressable injury. “The problem for [counsel] is that the district court issued no formal sanction against him . . . . Rather, it removed the privilege of appearing pro hac vice . . . . Here, there would be no relief that we could grant [counsel], such as by reinstating his admission pro hac vice. The underlying case is over, having been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the settlement.”

The panel finally notes the conundrum of having dismissed successive appeals as too early and too late, but counters that counsel had the options (not taken) of either having the appeal certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or seeking a writ of mandamus. Still, I’d note that section 1292(b) is only for questions of law (not really presented here) while even the panel admits that mandamus would not lie under these circumstances. So in truth, a lawyer in these circumstances (at least in the Seventh Circuit) might find themselves in conflict with their client’s interest in settlement, which wipes out the lawyer’s appeal rights.