In Fylling v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 21-13612 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2024), the Eleventh Circuit holds that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a juror whose niece worked for the defendant continue to sit on a jury, without at least engaging in some inquiry about whether the family relationship might impair the juror’s impartiality.
During voir dire at a personal injury trial, the judge asked the venire panel a series of questions to test their partiality, though never asked “Royal Caribbean’s proposed question about whether the prospective jurors had any relatives who worked for a cruise line.” In wrap-up, the judge asked the panelists whether “you think of any reason why you cannot sit on this jury and render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?” One panelist (an investor in the defendant) was excused based on his answer to this question; the other panelists did not respond.
After opening statements, it came to light that Juror Eight had a niece that worked at Royal Caribbean. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the juror continuing to sit as a juror. The judge, after a colloquy with counsel on the matter, took no action to remove the juror and allowed her to sit for the rest of a ten-day trial.
On day-nine, the judge put on the record that Juror Eight “has indicated that she could be fair” and that even though plaintiff’s counsel “might have used a peremptory challenge on her,” they “had already used all of [their] peremptory challenges, long before we got to this juror.” Further, the judge found that “Juror Eight’s niece’s employment did not justify her removal from the jury, reasoning that any verdict ‘is not going to break Royal Caribbean and therefore, her niece is not likely to get fired.’”
The jury returned a verdict finding Royal Caribbean negligent but reducing the award by 90% for the plaintiff’s supposed contributory negligence (from $750,000 to $75,000).
The Eleventh Circuit remands the case for a new trial. The district court erred by not conducting further inquiry once the familial relationship came to light. “[W]hen a juror reveals a familial connection to a party, the district court must—at minimum—develop a record adequate to rule on whether the juror is actually or impliedly biased,” and “that task, in turn, requires ‘specific questioning.’”
Here, the judge “did not place Juror Eight under oath to ask her specific, direct questions about whether she could serve impartially despite her niece’s employment by Royal Caribbean. And the district court allowed Juror Eight to deliberate when it could have excused her for cause and still had enough jury members to return a verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (‘A jury must begin with at least 6 and no more than 12 members, and each juror must participate in the verdict unless excused under Rule 47(c).’). Permitting Juror Eight to remain on the jury without questioning her further was an abuse of discretion.”
The panel allows that the familial relationship was “not a direct one between a juror and a party, but one between a juror and an employee of a party,” but the duty of inquiry applies nonetheless. “Because the district court did not ask Juror Eight any specific questions about her relationship with her niece or her niece’s employment, we have no way of knowing key facts that would confirm or dispel the reasonable possibility of bias. We cannot know, for example, whether Juror Eight’s niece is compensated with stock options, works in Royal Caribbean’s legal or risk management departments, or gives Juror Eight cruise discounts. Without this specific and direct questioning, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Juror Eight to participate in deliberations.”
Juror Eight’s “silence in response to [the judge’s] general question whether anyone could think of a reason they could not be impartial” was insufficient to meet the duty of inquiry. The Eleventh Circuit (and the predecessor Fifth Circuit) have repeatedly held that such “[b]road, vague questions of the venire will not suffice” in the face of a specific, factual conflict.
“In sum, when it discovered during trial that one of the jurors had a niece who worked for Royal Caribbean, a party in the trial, the district court was obligated to investigate the matter further and exercise its discretion properly by developing ‘the facts fully enough so it [could] make an informed judgment on the question of actual bias’ . . . . Because the district court did not conduct such an inquiry, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make an informed judgment on the question of the Juror Eight’s bias and by allowing Juror Eight to deliberate over the objection of [plaintiff]’s counsel.” The case is remanded for a new trial.
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