Alleged Shoving Match Between Counsel at a Deposition Leads to Sanctions and an Appeal to the Seventh Circuit

In Vega v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., No. 23-1183 (7th Cir. July 29, 2024), the Seventh Circuit affirms in part and reverses in part sanctions awarded by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent authority after an acrimonious deposition that allegedly led to a physical confrontation.

“On July 13, 2017, Plaintiffs’ attorneys Caryn Shaw and Donald Villar met at the Board’s office building to depose Jadine Chou, the [defendant Chicago Board of Education]’s Chief of Security. The Plaintiffs’ third attorney Anne Shaw did not attend. Chou was represented by Lisa Dreishmire, the Assistant Deputy General Counsel for the Board . . . . By all accounts, it was a tense encounter, with the Board’s attorneys objecting early, often, and at great lengths.”

“According to the witnesses . . . , when the deposition ended, as Dreishmire was leaving the room, a frustrated Caryn Shaw screamed at her, asking ‘what the [f***] is your problem.’ Dreishmire reentered the room and instructed the court reporter to go back on the record. Shaw responded, ‘No, this is personal,’ and moved in Dreishmire’s direction.”

Dreishmire claimed that Caryn Shaw “physically assaulted her by pushing her out of the room” while Shaw contended that she was trying to leave the room and merely made “unintentional contact” with Dreishmire. Dreishmire called the police to press charges, and later filed a complaint against Shaw with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC).

The district court judge convened a two-day evidentiary hearing on the matter. In March of 2018, it ordered Caryn Shaw off the case and awarded fees and costs to defense counsel. In a subsequent order, the judge denied a motion to reconsider and further required “Plaintiffs’ counsel” to “reimburse Defendants $11,920.95 in attorney fees and costs.”

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirms the sanction against Caryn Shaw but vacates against the other plaintiffs’ counsel, owing to lack of notice of intent to join them in the sanction. (The panel briefly addresses whether the other two attorneys were covered by notice of appeal and concludes, per Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(7), that their intent to appeal was “otherwise clear from the notice” despite that they were not individually named therein.)

The panel rejects Caryn Shaw’s due process argument that the district court failed to “hold a separate hearing on whether she should be sanctioned.” It notes that “a separate hearing is not required before imposing sanctions, and a party who fails to request a separate hearing can waive any right to such a hearing.” It holds, in any event, that the sanctioned attorney “had several opportunities to respond or to defend herself in writing” and forfeited the notice argument below.

It also affirms the sanction on the merits, finding no clear error or abuse of discretion.

“Witnesses for both sides—Villar, Strohl, and Dreishmire—testified that Shaw initiated the encounter by swearing at Dreishmire as Dreishmire was leaving the deposition room. And most of the witnesses testified that Shaw physically touched or pushed Dreishmire . . . . We agree with the district court that Shaw ‘must have known that her representations were false’ because she was ‘a direct participant in the confrontation.’ That constitutes bad faith and vexatious conduct under our precedent, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding as much.”

The panel finally rejects the argument that the district court ought to have abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), until the ARDC ruled on the pending disciplinary complaint. “The district court’s sanction for Shaw’s conduct in the federal case would have no effect (let alone an adverse effect) on the ARDC’s decision of whether and how to discipline Shaw. And the mere fact that the district court and the ARDC could run parallel investigations and each impose sanctions for Shaw’s behavior is not enough to require abstention, for we have held that the mere existence of parallel proceedings does not require a district court to invoke Younger.

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