In Kumar v. Koester, No. 23-4363 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025), the Ninth Circuit dismisses a constitutional challenge to California State University’s anti-discrimination policy that was recently amended to add “caste” as a protected status.
Effective January 1, 2022, CSU’s “Policy Prohibiting Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Exploitation, Dating Violence, Domestic Violence, Stalking, and Retaliation based on listed protected classes” was amended to add “caste” to the definition of protected classes. It defined “Nationality Race or Ethnicity” to include “color, caste, or ancestry.”
“The Policy does not define ‘caste.’ CSU released a ‘Q&A Caste Inclusion in CSU Discrimination Policy’ document, which states that ‘[t]he inclusion of caste was not added as a specific and separate protected category, but as a parenthetical reference to clarify we consider caste, color and ancestry to be included within the already-existing categories of race or ethnicity.’ Neither the Policy nor the Q&A document mention Hinduism.”
The two plaintiffs challenging this new provision “are CSU professors of Indian descent and adherents to the Hindu religion.” “The complaint alleges violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and equivalent claims under the California Constitution . . . . The complaint alleges that the Policy violates the Due Process Clause as unconstitutionally vague because the Policy does not define the term ‘caste,’ and the term ‘is not . . . understood by people of ordinary intelligence.’ It alleges that the Policy violates the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment by defining the Hindu religion as including a caste system, and in doing so, ‘ascrib[es] an oppressive and discriminatory caste system to the entire Hindu religion.’”
The district court dismissed the Due Process claim for lack of an Article III injury on which to find standing, while entering judgment in favor of the defendants on the Religion Clause claims after a bench trial.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit holds that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring any of their constitutional claims.
First, the panel affirms dismissal of the Due Process claim for lack of standing.
“Even after a fully developed record, [Plaintiffs-]Appellants failed to show that they intend to engage in any religious practice that could reasonably constitute caste discrimination or harassment such that the Policy would be enforced against them. In fact, the record suggests the opposite: Appellants intend to comply with the Policy, not to violate it . . . . This is because they ‘abhor’ caste discrimination and do not believe that caste is ‘in any way part of the Hindu religion or its teachings.’”
“Appellants claim that their injury is self-censorship of nondiscriminatory religious conduct out of fear that such conduct could be misinterpreted as discriminatory given that ‘caste’ is not defined.” But fear of self-censorship requires proof of the likelihood that the party will face prosecution. “Appellants have not offered any evidence that celebrating a Hindu festival outside of their workplace, or speaking about doing so within their workplace, constitutes discrimination or harassment as defined by the Policy on any basis, let alone on the basis of caste.”
Second, the panel vacates the district court’s decision on the Religion Clauses, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue those, too.
Regarding the Free Exercise clause, “[w]e conclude that Appellants have alleged no injury to their ability to exercise their religion. Rather, their claims only indicate that they are offended by an alleged association of the caste system with Hinduism. This is the exact ‘moral, ideological, or policy objection to a particular government action’ that the injury in fact requirement is meant to ‘screen[] out.’”
Finally, regarding the Establishment Clause, because “Appellants’ alleged spiritual injury—stigma from belonging to a religion that CSU has impermissibly defined and disapproved of—is entangled with the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, the district court’s rationale for dismissing the claim on the merits explains why Appellants failed to maintain standing. After a fully developed record, the district court made a factual finding that the Policy had no hostility toward religion. It based that finding on (1) the fact that the Policy does not mention Hinduism; (2) dictionary definitions show ‘caste’ is ‘readily defined without reference to Hinduism’ as a ‘distinct class or rank in any society’; and (3) the absence of evidence that Appellee or the Policy’s stakeholders expressed ‘anti-Hindu sentiments’ . . . . If the Policy does not stigmatize Hinduism, Appellants have no spiritual injury. And if there is no injury, there is no standing.”
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