In Carbone v. Kaal, No. 24-3795 (6th Cir. June 20, 2025), the Sixth Circuit affirms the dismissal of a tort action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), holding that though the defendants allegedly transmitted defamatory statements through a server in Ohio, this fact alone did not support laying specific personal jurisdiction in that forum.
“Robert Carbone, who lives in Connecticut, sued two Swiss organizations and several individuals who live in California, Illinois, and Switzerland for defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone was a member of the two Swiss organizations. He claims that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and to facilitate his removal from the organizations. He decided to file suit in Ohio. Why Ohio? Because the Swiss organizations maintained servers in Ohio that hosted the organizations’ websites. So Carbone’s theory is that the allegedly improper statements about him would have passed through the servers in Ohio on the way to their destination. Nothing else connected any of the parties to Ohio.”
“Carbone sued Defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio for defamation, tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation, invoking the court’s diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Carbone does not contend that he—or any defendant—lives in or even visits Ohio. Instead, in his complaint, Carbone alleges that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they ‘transacted business in Ohio, engaged in business acts in Ohio and/or caused a tortious injury through events occurring in Ohio’ . . . . In particular, ETA and OSSA maintain websites with servers located in Ohio.”
The district court granted dismissal of the action on the pleadings and affidavits, and the Sixth Circuit affirms.
The only issue presented was whether the presence or use of the defendants’ servers in Ohio to communicate the alleged defamatory comment created specific personal jurisdiction in that forum. The Sixth Circuit holds that the plaintiff cannot establish purposeful availment of Ohio to commit the alleged tort. “[T]he complaint does not allege that anyone in Ohio read the defamatory statements, and Defendants’ allegedly tortious actions never targeted anyone in Ohio . . . . Carbone never asserted that the defamatory statements concerned conduct occurring in Ohio or Ohio residents. Nor did he contend that anyone in Ohio read the statements or that he suffered an injury in Ohio.”
Nor does the physical presence of the servers in Ohio change the outcome.
“Carbone resists [our] conclusion by arguing that Defendants targeted Ohio by using Ohio-based servers to commit the tortious acts. But mere transmission of information through a server has little, if any, effect in Ohio . . . . All in all, Carbone cannot rely on the effects of Defendants’ allegedly tortious actions to establish personal jurisdiction in Ohio.”
“Carbone also argues, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, that an Ohio court can maintain personal jurisdiction over Defendants based on Defendants choosing to locate website servers there . . . . [He] asserts that Defendants had either actual or constructive knowledge that their agents selected Ohio as the location for the servers. Yet even assuming Defendants knew of the servers’ location, their use of Ohio-based servers alone fails to create a ‘substantial connection’ between Defendants and Ohio.” The opinion, though, repeatedly notes the physical absence of defendants from the state. “Indeed, [defendants] contracted with third parties who independently chose to locate the servers in Ohio. And Carbone neither alleged nor established by affidavit that Defendants themselves chose the server location or sought a financial benefit from locating them in Ohio.”
“True enough, Carbone declares that the defamatory statements and votes on his removal passed through the Ohio-based servers. Even so, it was not the physical transmittal of information through a server that constituted the allegedly tortious activity . . . . Instead, Defendants’ actions elsewhere—writing and communicating defamatory statements and facilitating Carbone’s removal—’form the ‘heart’ of the cause of action’ . . . . . Carbone thus failed to show that his claims arose from Defendants’ connections to Ohio.”
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