In Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Cntr., No. 24-2990 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), the Third Circuit becomes the fourth U.S. Court of Appeals to hold that the Equal Access to Justice Act fee-shifting provision applies to successful litigants in habeas cases (while two other circuits hold that it does not). The issue is whether habeas, here from immigration detention, is a “civil action” as defined by the EAJA. The answer will have significance for the many individuals swept up in the current Administration’s deportation program, at least those detained in the geographic boundaries of Third Circuit.
“[T]he Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provides that the prevailing private party ‘in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)’ brought by or against the United States is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs if the Government’s position was not ‘substantially justified’ or ‘special circumstances make an award unjust.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Adolph ‘Lee’ Michelin and Adewumi Abioye prevailed in habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging their immigration detentions. The District Courts found the Government’s positions were not ‘substantially justified’ and awarded the detainees fees and costs. The main question these consolidated cases present is whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from immigration detention under § 2241 is an EAJA ‘civil action.’”
The panel holds that that habeas actions, as a rule, are “civil actions” and that the EAJA thus waives the U.S. Government’s sovereign immunity to recovery of fees and costs.
Although the statute does not expressly define “civil action,” the panel notes that in controlling Supreme Court authority, standard legal dictionaries, and prevailing common law, habeas has been consistently defined as a civil action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves also treat habeas as within its ambit. “Rule 1 provided that the Rules applied to ‘all suits of a civil nature . . . with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (1980). And Rule 81 specified the Rules “are applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (1980). We know of no relevant statute or practice that would have negated the civil status of immigration challenges like this one.”
The government argued that “habeas is ‘unique’ because it seeks release from confinement . . . . But what settles its status [as a class of legal action] is the right it seeks to vindicate, not the remedy. Habeas actions are civil because they protect the civil right to personal liberty.”
The government also cast the EAJA language as “ambiguous,” because – following the rules of construction – “[a]ny ambiguity is ‘to be construed in favor of [governments] immunity” to monetary damages. But the panel finds no ambiguity in the EAJA. “Zoom out one word, and we find the provision does not just say ‘civil action.’ It says ‘any civil action.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). On [petitioners’] interpretation, the word ‘any’ matters: it conveys that the statute reaches civil actions ‘of whatever kind’—even variations like habeas proceedings.” Moreover, “Congress explicitly carved out torts. The ‘proper inference’ is that Congress did not implicitly carve out habeas actions. The Government’s sole response is that because habeas is not a civil action, Congress did not have to exclude it expressly. But as we have shown, it is civil.”
The panel additionally notes that the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have already rules similarly, while the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have sided with the government on this issue.
Finally, on the merits, the panel holds that “the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Government’s position in [the action below] was not substantially justified. After detaining Abioye for over 16 months, with reason to think he would remain in custody for months or years to come, the Government had no reasonable basis in law for fighting to deny him an individualized bond hearing.”
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