In Rudometkin v. Driscoll, No. 25-5033 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2026), the D.C. Circuit considers its jurisdiction over two pro se notices of appeal filed beyond the 30- or 60-day deadline. It holds that “if a pro se notice of appeal can reasonably be read as recognizing that the appeal is late, providing reasons for that lateness, and requesting relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6), then it should be construed to include a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion.”
“Congress has required that a notice of appeal in a civil case be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, or within 60 days if a party is a United States officer sued in an official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)–(b); accord Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)–(B). These time limits are ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”
Yet a “district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); accord Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)–(5).
In the present matter, the D.C. Circuit held argument in two cases to consider whether it could accept jurisdiction of a late-filed pro se notice of appeal when the notice also explains why it is late and requests leave to file in accordance with the rules.
In the first appeal, plaintiff-appellant Rudometkin filed notice of appeal of denial of a preliminary injunction in a federal-agency Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case on day-69. In relevant part, the notice stated that appellant only recently became aware of the denial (which may be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)) via a third party. Thus, “in the event this notice of appeal does not reach the court in time, Plaintiff requests an[] extension of time as per Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i)(ii) [sic], as this notice of appeal is within 30 days of the sixty day time limit and there is good cause to grant an extension, as per Rule 4(a)(6)(A)—Plaintiff has never received notice of the Court’s order.”
In the second appeal, plaintiff-appellant Godson filed notice of appeal of final judgment in a medical malpractice case on day-37. Besides numerous irrelevant tangents, the notice stated that he “was only made aware of his dismissal of December 4, 2024 while here in Washington, DC for the day of rememb[ra]nce for President Jimmy Carter” and accused defense counsel of “refus[ing] to accept service on behalf of []his clients.” It did not cite the federal statute or rule about requesting an extension of time.
In both cases, the district court declined to construe the notices to include a Rule 4(a)(5) or (6) motion.
The D.C. Circuit, reviewing the district court’s decisions de novo, holds that the Rudometkin notice was sufficient to trigger review under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6), but not the Godson notice.
The panel first holds that nothing in the rules requires the filing of a formal, separate motion for an extension. “[A] litigant can move for Rule 4(a)(5) and (6) relief without explicitly using the word ‘motion’ or citing those provisions. And he can do so in a document labeled—and simultaneously serving—as a notice of appeal.” But even absent the formality of a separate, properly captioned motion, an notice must “reasonably be read as recognizing that the appeal is late, providing reasons for that lateness, and requesting extra time to appeal.” The panel notes that other U.S. Courts of Appeals had already so ruled.
The Rudometkin notice meets this standard. The allegation that the appellant had not received notice of the denial of a preliminary injunction “implicitly recognizes a timeliness problem, provides a reason for the delay, and, because it is made in a notice of appeal, seeks relief from the problem.” Not receiving notice of the district court order “suggests ‘good cause’ for an extension under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) and bears directly on the threshold condition for reopening under Rule 4(a)(6)(A)—that ‘the moving party did not receive’ proper notice of ‘the entry of the judgment’ within ‘21 days after entry.’”
“Because only the district court may extend or reopen the time to appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), we order a limited remand for the district court to rule on Rudometkin’s motions.”
But the Godson notice falls short. Though the appellant also alleged not getting notice of the district court’s judgment, “given the amount of reconstruction necessary to recast that statement as a request for relief and that it is buried in the midst of a filing overwhelmingly directed at criticizing the district court’s conduct throughout the litigation and raising other grievances, Godson’s notice of appeal cannot reasonably be read as acknowledging a timeliness problem and seeking relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6).” Thus, the district court did not err in failing to construe the notice as a motion under those rules.
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