In Civelli v. Mulacek, No. 26-20183 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 2026) (per curiam), a 2-1 panel holds in a diversity case where a jury awarded more than $210 million that the Texas state-law cap on supersedeas bonds at $25 million does not apply in federal court, either by operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 or the Erie doctrine.
Defendants, the Mulaceks, “moved to stay . . . judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b), which permits a party to ‘obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). Ordinarily, a supersedeas bond ‘will be set in an amount that will permit satisfaction of the judgment in full, together with costs, interest, and damages for delay.’ 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2905 (3d ed.). The Mulaceks, however, sought approval of a $25 million bond—far less than the amount required to secure full satisfaction—invoking a Texas statute that caps supersedeas bonds at that amount. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 52.006(b)(2).”
The district court denied the request, rejecting the $25 million cap, and the defendants renewed their request for a stay on appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(B) and (2).
The Fifth Circuit also denies the stay, rejecting defendants’ arguments that Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) incorporates state law or, alternatively, that “the cap is substantive and thus applies under Erie.” (Judge Oldham, concurring in the order, states in a brief separate opinion that he would limit the analysis to whether the district court was within its discretion under Rule 62 in setting the amount of the bond, declining to reach the other legal issues.)
With respect to Rule 69, there is no basis to conclude that it incorporates state rules governing stays of enforcement. Reading Rule 69(a)(1) as defendants would “turn[s] a rule about how judgments are enforced into a rule about when enforcement may begin. That is not what Rule 69 says, and it does not fit how the rules are organized.”
The argument fares no better under an Erie analysis. Defendants argued that the cap is substantive “because its absence shifts settlement leverage to judgment creditors” and thus it is outcome determinative. Yet “[v]irtually every procedural rule—pleading, discovery, evidence, you name it—affects settlement dynamics. That does not make them substantive.”
Defendants also argue the cap secures “the right to meaningful appeal” for judgment debtors. Whether true or not, “those are litigation interests—interests in how judgments are enforced and reviewed once liability is fixed . . . . [I]n federal litigation, both interests are governed by federal law—not state law . . . . . Erie is concerned with something else: forum shopping and unequal administration of the laws. That litigants may prefer one forum’s bond rules to another’s does not itself amount to the kind of forum shopping Erie addresses.”
In sum, “Texas’s supersedeas-bond cap does not apply in federal court. The Mulaceks offer no other basis for a $25 million bond. Their motion to approve a $25 million supersedeas bond is DENIED.”
