In Khatabi v. Car Auto Holdings LLC, No. 24-12573 (11th Cir. May 28, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit holds that the “administrative termination” of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and 59 motions to facilitate a post-trial mediation was not sufficiently conclusive to restart the 30-day clock for filing an appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
“Malak Khatabi sued Car Auto Holdings LLC—a car dealership—and its manager . . . for sex discrimination under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. A jury awarded her $81,028 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages.”
“After the verdict, the dealership and [the manager] filed two post-judgment motions” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and 59, in which “they sought judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and a reduction of the damages award.”
“Sensing an opportunity to resolve the case without more litigation, the district court, on its own initiative and before Khatabi responded to the motions, referred the parties to a magistrate judge for mediation. The mediation would be held within four weeks. In the meantime, the court ordered, the motions would be administratively terminated.”
The case did not settle, the motions were reinstated on the docket, and the district court eventually denied all post-judgment relief except for the motion to dismiss the manager
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the administration termination did not “dispose of” the motions for purposes of Rule 4(a)(4)(A). That rule provides that “[i]f a party files in the district court” a timely Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) or 59(e) motion, then “the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”
Here, the plaintiff argued that the original “administrative termination” was the “order disposing” of the motions, and that the 30 days to appeal ran from that event.
The Eleventh Circuit rejects this interpretation of “disposing of,” finding the administrative termination too indefinite to meet the standards of Rule 4(a)(4)(A). Citing to dictionary definitions of “dispose,” the panel interprets this language to require a final, definite, or conclusive order, not one (as here) simply postponing a resolution.
“The district court’s administrative termination didn’t ‘dispose of’ the defendants’ post-judgment motions because the court didn’t intend for the termination to be final . . . . If the mediation failed,” the order provided that the court would direct the clerk “of court “to reinstate the post-judgment motions. It then set a time in which the mediation would take place. When the mediation failed, the district court reached the merits of both motions.”
Thus, “[b]ecause the administrative termination didn’t ‘dispose of’ the post-judgment motions, it didn’t start the thirty-day period to appeal the initial judgment, as Khatabi contends.”
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