In Estate of Elijah Isham v. Richardson, No. 25-3942 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2026), the Sixth Circuit holds that the district court erred in dismissing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case originally filed pro se by the father of a decedent, holding that there is no jurisdictional or other infirmity that would render such a case a “nullity.”
“Early one morning, officers responded to a rollover auto crash on the interstate near Moraine, Ohio. Upon arriving at the scene, they encountered Elijah Isham (Elijah) trapped inside an overturned car. Although Elijah was badly injured, first responders reportedly saw him smoking meth and brandishing a gun from inside the vehicle. A standoff ensued in which officers fatally shot Elijah.”
Elijah’s father, Ralph Isham (Isham), filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se against multiple defendants for his son’s death, in his capacity as administrator.
“Not long after the filing, the district court issued a sua sponte order. Looking to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the district court observed that Isham’s status as administrator did not necessarily permit him to advocate the estate’s interests in court without the assistance of counsel. Only if Isham were the estate’s sole beneficiary, and only if the estate had no creditors, could Isham lawfully proceed pro se.”
While Isham eventually obtained counsel, defendants successfully moved to dismiss, on the ground that Isham was not entitled to proceed pro se at the time he filed the complaint. Under what is known as the “nullity rule,” the pro se party’s “subsequent hiring of counsel ma[kes] no difference; his initial pro se status meant that the district court had to treat the complaint as though it had never been filed in the first place.”
The Sixth Circuit reverses. The panel initially reaffirms that a pro se filing on behalf of an estate is invalid, because pro se representation is only permitted in federal court in one’s own interest, not on behalf of others. “That prohibition extends to pro se litigants who wish to appear on behalf of ‘a corporation, a partnership, a minor child,’ or as here, ‘an estate.’”
The issue presented, though, was the legal effect of this invalidity on the action. The district court’s “ruling tees up an issue of apparent first impression: What happens when a pro se litigant initiates a lawsuit in violation of § 1654? Is the defect curable by later retaining counsel, as the estate sees it? Or is any complaint filed contrary to this statutory requirement a ‘legal nullity,’ as the district court put it, destined inevitably for dismissal?”
The panel notes a split in the circuits on this issue, with the Eighth Circuit holding that such actions are void ab initio and that the defect cannot be cured by later hiring counsel, while the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits rejected the Eighth Circuit’s nullity rule.
The panel sides with the latter circuits, holding such a filing to be a curable procedural error rather than one that affects the federal judicial power to hear a case. “[T]he prohibition on pro se representation of third parties comes from § 1654, a federal statute . . . . As federal law dictates how federal courts handle pro se representation, it must also determine the consequences of filing a pro se complaint on another’s behalf.”
The panel notes the rationale of the “nullity rule” to deter improper filings on behalf of the interest of third parties. “If protecting innocent third parties is the goal, then the nullity rule regularly betrays its own rationale. Often, courts following that rule declare as null a duly appointed (albeit pro se) representative’s complaint long after the regular statute of limitations would have run . . . . That is what happened in this case. Unless an applicable savings statute affords a second shot, the otherwise blameless real party in interest may well lose the chance to litigate the merits with a new complaint.”
It also rejects an alternative argument that a pro se pleading on behalf of an estate is defective under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), requiring that “[e]very pleading . . . be signed” by an “attorney of record” or “by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” Even if the signature rule were violated in these circumstances, the rule itself provides that the error is correctable, i.e., allowing litigants to “promptly correct[]” breaches of the signature requirement “after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.”
“In sum, even though § 1654 prohibits pro se litigants from proceeding on behalf of third parties, a lawsuit filed in violation of that command does not lie outside a federal court’s ability to adjudicate. Nor do we see any basis to displace the usual discretion afforded to district courts to discipline those who appear before them.”
